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INTRODUCTION
President George W Bush's recent re-nomination of 20 federal
judges previously blocked by Senate Democrats, two recent vacancies on
the Supreme Court, and the political showdown over filibustering judicial
nominees have heightened the Congressional debate over the role ideology
should play in evaluating candidates for the federal judiciary. During Presi-
dent Bush's first term, Senate Democrats employed filibusters to block 10 of
the President's 52 nominees to the Courts of Appeals.' Democrats maintain
that these conservative jurists hold views that are outside of the political
* B.A. 2002, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill; J.D. expected 2005,
Michigan Law School. I would like to thank Professor Jill Hasday for her valuable assis-
tance with the writing of this Note.
1. Michael A. Fletcher, Bush Will Renominate 20Judges; Fights in Senate Likely Over
Blocked Choices, WASH. POST, Dec. 24, 2004, at Al.
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mainstream--a charge that Republicans vociferously dispute.2 During his
recent confirmation hearings,Judge John Roberts faced intense question-
ing about his views on salient social issues.3 Prominent members of both
political parties predict that the next nominee to the United States Su-
preme Court will face a potentially acrimonious confirmation process
that will probe the ideological leanings of the nominee.4
Amidst this politically-charged dispute over the ideologies of federal
court nominees, I examine the role ofjudges' ideologies in case outcomes
in one area of civil rights law: disparate impact employment discrimina-
tion lawsuits by African American plaintiffs under Title VII of the 1964
Civil Rights Act. Title VII disparate impact cases provide a unique win-
dow through which to observe the effect ofjudges' ideologies because the
unsettled state of disparate impact law may give judges more individual
discretion to decide such cases. The current uncertainty in disparate im-
pact law results primarily from the adoption of the 1991 Civil Rights
Act'; standards for evaluating disparate impact claims were significantly less
ambiguous in the pre-1991 era. Therefore, a study of disparate impact
cases decided before and after the 1991 Act makes it possible to test the
hypothesis that lawmakers can mitigate the ideologically-driven discretion
of federal judges by enacting less ambiguous standards for deciding cases.
Congress enacted the 1991 Civil Rights Acte to mitigate the chilling
effects of two decades of federal court decisions limiting the availability of
Title VII disparate impact suits challenging facially-neutral employment
practices. The Act specifically sought to overturn elements of the 1989
Supreme Court decision in Wards Cove Packing Co., Inc. v. Atonio, which
restricted Title VII plaintiffs' use of statistical evidence and eliminated the
burden of persuasion on employers to refute a prima facie case of dispa-
rate impact.8 Numerous commentators have assumed that the Act's vague
exceptions and ambiguous language would result in arbitrary decisions
and ultimately fail to mute Wards Cove restrictions on disparate impact
2. Id.
3. Todd S. Purdum, With His Goal Clear, the Noninee Provides a Profile in Caution
During Questioning, N.YTMES, Sept. 14, 2004, at A25 (describing intense questioning from
Senator Biden on Roberts' civil rights record).
4. Michael A. Fletcher and Charles Babington, Partisans Gear Up for High Court
Fight Ahead;Activists Mobilize Over Bush's Vow to Nominate Conservative, WASH. PosT, March
13, 2005, at A5 (stating that "with Bush expected to follow through on his promise to
nominate a staunch conservative to fill any Supreme Court vacancy, groups on both sides
of the political spectrum are girding for an all-out battle.").
5. 42 U.S.C. 5 2000e-2 (2004).
6. Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2004).
7. See Mojica v. Gannett Co., 986 F.2d 1158, 1168 (7th Cir. 1993) (noting that
Wards Cove was among several cases overruled by the 1991 Civil Rights Act); Allen v. En-
tergy Corp., 193 F3d 1010, 1015 (8th Cir. 1999) (stating that the "1991 Civil Rights Act
expressly amended TitleVII to overrule the Wards Cove analysis").
8. 490 U.S. 642 (1989).
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litigation. However, very little comprehensive analysis explores the extent
to which the decline of successful disparate impact challenges is attribut-
able to the shifting ideology of the federal judiciary. Because the
ambiguity in disparate impact doctrine created by the 1991 Civil Rights
Act is likely to facilitate ideologically-driven judicial decisions, ' the in-
creasingly conservative composition of the federal judiciary may explain a
significant part of the decline in successful Title VII challenges to facially-
neutral employment practices.
This study employs various statistical techniques to test the efficacy
of the 1991 Civil Rights Act in moderating the highly restrictive disparate
impact regime imposed by Wards Cove, and to evaluate the hypothesis that
political ideology should be a more powerful predictor of case outcomes
following the 1991 Act. Part I of the paper describes the evolution of dis-
parate impact doctrine from 1971 to the present. Part II analyzes data
from randomly selected disparate impact cases brought by African Ameri-
can plaintiffs and finds that the current disparate impact doctrine
emanating from the 1991 Civil Rights Act dramatically decreases the like-
lihood that such plaintiffs will successfully challenge facially-neutral
employment practices. Two significant observations may be gleaned from
Part II: first, that the ideologies of judges on the appellate panels deciding
TitleVII cases exert a far more significant impact on case outcomes in the
post-1991 period; and, next, that one important explanation for the de-
cline of successful disparate impact claims is that politically conservative
judges decide a greater percentage of recent cases. Based on these findings,
Part III argues that Congressional action to clarify disparate impact stan-
dards is essential to preserve Title VII as a conduit through which African
Americans can seek redress for discrimination.
The importance of the study's central finding, that new legal stan-
dards and the increasingly conservative federal judiciary dramatically
curtail successful disparate impact litigation, cannot be understated. A
meaningful disparate impact doctrine is necessary to vitiate the need for
plaintiffs to establish discriminatory intent by employers. The Supreme
Court emphasized in Griggs v. Duke Power Co. that "the [1964 Civil
Rights] Act proscribes not only overt discrimination but also practices
9. See Kingsley R. Browne, The Civil Rights Act of 1991:A "Quota Bill," a Codifica-
tion of Griggs, a Partial Return to Wards Cove, or All of the Above?, 43 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
287,350 (1993).
10. See generally Donald R. Songer, Martha Humphries Ginn, and Tammy A. Sarver,
Do Judges Follow the Law hen There is No Fear of Reversal?, 24 JusT. Sys. J. 137, 137-62
(2003).
11. Numerous commentators have posited that federal judges appointed by Repub-
lican presidents are more skeptical of civil rights claims than Democratic appointees. See,
e.g.,Timothy B. Tomasi &Jess A.Velona, All the President's Men: A Study of Ronald Reagan's
Appointments to the US. Courts of Appeals, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 766, 776-77 (1987) (observ-
ing that Reagan appointees were hostile to the claims of civil rights plaintiffs).
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that are fair in form, but discriminatory in operation."12 Without an effec-
tive method for challenging facially-neutral employment practices,
successful challenges will be limited to the rare cases of unsophisticated
employers who flaunt their inclinations to discriminate. These limited
"smoking gun" cases cannot eradicate unconscious discrimination or
remedy disparate outcomes emanating from social conditions wrought by
the pre-1964 legal subjugation of African Americans.13 Absent Congres-
sional intervention, Title VII litigation will not be an effective instrument
with which "to achieve equality of employment opportunities and re-
move barriers that have operated in the past to favor an identifiable group
of white employees over other employees.
4
I.THE DEVELOPMENT OF VAGUE LEGAL STANDARDS
A brief review of important elements of the Title VII disparate im-
pact doctrine reveals the ambiguities in current legal standards.
A. Establishment of Title VII Disparate Impact Doctrine
The Supreme Court established the basic framework for disparate
impact adjudication in Griggs v. Duke Power Co. The Griggs case arose
from a challenge by African American employees of a generating plant
operated by Duke Power. Duke Power required workers to obtain a high
school diploma or pass an intelligence test in order to transfer into certain
jobs at the plant.1" The employees presented evidence that African Ameri-
can workers were less likely to meet the diploma and intelligence test
requirements than White employees. Applying the standard outlined be-
low, the Griggs court concluded that Duke Power's requirements violated
Title VII because they adversely affected African American workers and
were not sufficiently related to job performance.1 6
Under Griggs, plaintiffs must initially establish a prima facie case of
discrimination by presenting statistical evidence showing that a facially-
neutral employment practice had an adverse impact on African American
employees or job applicants.1 7 The Griggs decision does not require plaintiffi
12. 401 U.S. 424,431 (1971).
13. Theodore Eisenberg & Sheri Lynn Johnson, The Effects of Intent: Do We Know
How Legal Standards Work?, 76 CORNELL L. RE. 1151, 1152 (1991) (asserting that "an in-
tent standard will rarely be satisfied").
14. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 429-30.
15. Id. at 425-26.
16. Id.
17. See Furnco Constr. Corp. v.Waters et al., 438 U.S. 567, 583 (1978) (stating that
"[a]s set out by the Court in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., to establish a prima facie case on
a disparate-impact claim, a plaintiff need not show that the employer had a discriminatory
[VOL. 11:247
Decline of Title VII Disparate Impact
to pinpoint the exact policy that adversely affected minority applicants;
plaintiffs may submit evidence of an adverse impact generally stemming
from vague or subjective hiring and promotion policies. Following the
Griggs approach, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals noted that
"[s]ubjective job criteria ... provides a convenient pretext for discrinuina-
tory practices. '
After identifying an objectionable employment practice, plaintiffs
must present statistical evidence establishing a prima facie case of dis-
crimination. The Supreme Court held in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green
that to establish a prima facie case, plaintiffs must demonstrate that the
tests in question select applicants for hire or promotion in a racial pattern
significantly different from that of the pool of applicants.' 9 To determine
the type of statistical evidence necessary to establish a prima facie case of
disparate impact, the Griggs court held that guidelines issued by the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), the agency responsible
for enforcement of the Civil Rights Act, should receive great deference.20
The Uniform Guidelines of Employee Selection Procedures issued by the
EEOC codify a "four-fifths rule.' '21 The rule states that a selection rate for
any race which is less than four-fifths of the rate for the race with the
highest rate will generally be regarded as evidence of adverse impact.22 In
addition to the EEOC guidelines, the Supreme Court recognized in
Hazelwood School District v. United States that a statistical disparity of more
than two standard deviations from the mean will also create an inference
of discrimination.23
Once plaintiffs establish a prima facie case of discrimination, the
burden of persuasion shifts to the employer to establish that the chal-
lenged practice was a business necessity.24 The Griggs court emphasized
that the employer is required to demonstrate that "any given requirement
must have a manifest relationship to the employment in question" or have a
"demonstrable relationship to successful performance of the jobs for which
[the practice is] used., 2' Finally, the Supreme Court ruled in Albemarle Paper
Co. v. Moody that even if employers met their burden of demonstrating a
manifest relationship, plaintiffs could still prevail under the Griggs analysis
intent but need only demonstrate that a particular practice in actuality 'operates to exclude
Negroes.' ").
18. Nanty v. Barrows Co., 660 F2d 1327, 1334 (9th Cir. 1981).
19. 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
20. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 433-34.
21. 29 C.ER. § 1607.4(D) (1979).
22. Id.
23. 433 U.S. 299,311 (1977).
24. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431.
25. Id. at 432.
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by showing that the employer was using the practice in question as a mere
26pretext for discrimination.
B. Wards Cove v. Atonio Places a Higher Burden on Plaintiffs
The Supreme Court altered the Griggs disparate impact framework
and expressly limited the availability of the disparate impact doctrine in its
1989 decision Wards Cove Packing Co., Inc. v.Atonio.2 The Court restricted
the ability of plaintiffs to establish disparate impact emanating from sub-
jective hiring or promotion practices. Under Wards Cove, plaintiffs are
"responsible for isolating and identifying the specific employment prac-
tices that are allegedly responsible for any observed statistical disparities.. 8
The Wards Cove decision requires plaintiffs to causally link the identified
29employment practice with a demonstrated adverse impact.
Wards Cove also restricts the type of statistical evidence plaintiffs may
tender to demonstrate adverse impact on racial minorities. The Wards
Cove Court asserted that previous decisions allowing plaintiffs to establish
a prima facie case of disparate impact merely by showing a relatively low
percentage of minority workers "fundamentally misconceived the role of
statistics in employment discrimination cases., 30 The Court restricted the
use of statistical evidence to comparisons between the racial composition
of the at-issue jobs and the racial composition of the qualified population
in the relevant labor market.31
The Wards Cove Court also eased the burden on employers to justify
challenged employment practices after the establishment of a prima facie
case of disparate impact. The Court held that employers must only carry
the "burden of producing evidence of a business justification for their
employment practice. The burden of persuasion, however, remains with
the disparate-impact plaintiff. 32 The Court emphasized that "[t]he dispo-
sitive issue is whether a challenged practice serves, in a significant way, the
legitimate employment goals of the employer .... [There is] no require-
ment that the challenged practice is 'essential' or 'indispensable' to the
employer's business ....
If employers articulate a legitimate employment goal, Wards Cove al-
lows plaintiffs to prevail only if they prove that "other tests or selection
26. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405,425 (1975).
27. 490 U.S. 642 (1989).
28. Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 656 (quoting Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487
U.S. 977,994 (1988)).
29. Id. at 657.
30. Id. at 650 (quoting Hazelwood School Dist.V United States, 433 U.S. 299, 308
(1977)).
31. Id. at 650-51.
32. Id. at 659.
33. Id.
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devices, without a similarly undesirable racial effect, would also serve the
employer's legitimate hiring interests.3 4 The Court stressed that plaintiffs
will not meet this burden unless their proposed alternative procedures are
equally effective as the challenged procedure and not significantly more
S 3-5
expensive.
C. 1991 Civil Rights Act Reverses Part of the Wards Cove Analysis
In response to the Supreme Court's restrictive interpretation of dispa-
rate impact claims, Congress reversed parts of the Wards Cove framework by
passing the 1991 Civil Rights Act.36 The ambiguous language and intent of
the Act confused the state of disparate impact law and allowed broad judi-
cial discretion. The Act codified the Wards Cove requirement that plaintiffs
demonstrate a causal link between a specific employment practice and thealleed dsparte " 37
alleged disparate impact. However, Congress created an exception for cri-
teria that "are not capable of separation for analysis."38 The meaning and
scope of this exception have been subject to significant debate among
scholars and judges.39
Similarly, the Act's mandate to replace the Wards Cove "legitimate
business justification" defense with a defense requiring the employer to
"demonstrate that the challenged practice is job related for the position in
question and consistent with business necessity'' 4 is also subject to con-
flicting interpretations by courts. The Act's official legislative history
declares that interpretation of the terms "business necessity" and "job re-
lated" should "have the meaning enunciated by the Supreme Court in
Griggs and in other Supreme Court decisions prior to Wards Cove."' Prior
Supreme Court decisions enumerate conflicting interpretations of these
terms. For example, in Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, the Court held that
employers must validate their challenged employment practices according
to the EEOC's "guidelines for employers seeking to determine, through
professional validation studies, whether their employment tests are job
34. Id. at 660 (quoting Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 442 U.S. 405,425 (1975)).
35. Id. at 661.
36. Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2004).
37. Id.
38. See id. at 5 2000e-2(k)(B)(i) (2004).
39. See, e.g., Paul N. Cox, On a Blindered Impact Model: A Response, 46 DEPAuL L.
REV. 265, 267-68 (1997) (discussing Professors Ramona Paetzold and Steven Wilborn's
proposed "stratification" and "concurrence" lenses that may be used when courts must
aggregate or disaggregate certain criteria for purposes of disparate impact analysis).
40. Ronald Turner, Thirty Years of Title VII's Regulatory Regime: Rights, Theories, and
Realities, 46 ALA. L. R-Ev. 375, 455 (1995) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (Supp.
V 1993)).
41. 137 CONG. REC. S15233, 15233-34 (daily ed. Oct. 25, 1991) (statement of Sen.
Danforth).
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related. 42 Conversely, the Court ignored the validation guidelines in
Washington v. Davis and held that employment practices must only have a
reasonable relationship to the job.43 The ambiguity created by the Act's
instruction for courts to make decisions based on conflicting precedents
and vague exceptions encourages broad judicial discretion based on the
ideologies of individual judges deciding Title VII disparate impact cases.
II. METHODS AND RESULTS
To test the effect of the Wards Cove decision and the 1991 Civil
Rights Act on disparate impact litigation and the influence of judges' po-
litical ideologies, I created a database of disparate impact cases decided by
the U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals. The unit of analysis in this study is the
decision by a Circuit Court of Appeals panel to approve or invalidate an
employment practice challenged by an African American plaintiff under
the Title VII disparate impact doctrine. Appeals court decisions that did
not either enter a final judgment on the challenged employment practice
or remand to the district court with instructions to enter a judgment
were not included in the study. 44 Similarly, the study does not address class
certification actions or litigation over the legitimacy of bona fide seniority
45
systems.
Data for this study were collected and analyzed from six circuits of
the United States Courts of Appeals: the Second, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh,
Ninth and Eleventh Circuits. These circuit courts were chosen based on
two criteria: geographic diversity46 and the presence of enough disparate
impact cases brought by African American plaintiffs within the circuit to
permit meaningful analysis. While this geographic diversity allows com-
parisons across regions, the selected circuits were not chosen at random
and the study does not purport to make any claims about the treatment of
cases in circuits excluded from the analysis. A total of 97 cases from these
six circuits were selected for this analysis.
42. Albemarle, 422 U.S. at 430-31.
43. 426 U.S. 229,250 (1976).
44. As a result, several issues tangentially related to disparate impact doctrine were
not included in the data set. For example, decisions solely concerned with the appropriate
standard of appellate review or the type of statistical evidence to be used in a disparate
impact challenge were excluded.
45. See Pullman-Standard v. Swint et al., 456 U.S. 273, 277 (1982) (holding that
bona fide seniority systems cannot be attacked on disparate impact grounds unless the
company adopted them specifically because of their discriminatory impact. This paper is
not concerned with cases assessing the intent of employers.).
46. The selected circuits are headquartered in New York City, Richmond, New
Orleans, Cincinnati, Chicago, San Francisco and Atlanta, respectively, and represent every
major region of the country.
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A. Data Sources
Information for research on these court decisions was collected us-
ing the online legal database Lexis Nexis. Various searches were used to
compile a list of all disparate impact cases brought by African American
plaintiffs for two time periods: January 1, 1977 through December 31,
1988 (cases following the Griggs and Hazelwood decisions, but before
Wards Cove) and January 1, 1992 through December 31, 2000 (cases fol-
lowing the 1991 Civil Rights Act and the Wards Cove decision). The data
set does not represent a random sample of all disparate impact cases
within these circuits for the time period of the study. To ensure that there
were a sufficient number of cases from each circuit for cross-circuit analy-
sis, the database includes all disparate impact cases brought by African
Americans in the three circuits with the lowest number of such cases: the
Second, Seventh and Eleventh Circuits. These three circuits are over-
represented in the database.
For the Ninth, Fifth and Sixth Circuits, which contained a larger
number of disparate impact decisions, systematic samples of cases were
selected for coding based on the guidelines enumerated by Earl Babbie.
4 7
In each of these three circuits, an interval was chosen by dividing the
number of total cases in the circuit by the number of desired cases (25). A
random number within the total range of cases was generated and used as
the starting point for selecting cases.48 Subsequent cases were selected by
adding the interval to the previous case. For example, if a circuit had 50
cases and the generated random number was 30, the first selected case
would be case 30, then case 32, then case 34, etc. In practice, systematic
sampling is virtually identical to random sampling.49
Information coded for each case includes the disposition of the case,
the race and gender of the plaintiff, the type of defendant, the type of
challenged employment practice, whether the plaintiff submitted evidence
satisfying either the four-fifths rule or two standard deviations criteria,
whether the plaintiff alleged past discrimination by the employer, and the
political affiliations of the judges on the panel who decided the case. Us-
ing the Database on the Attributes of United States Appeals Court Judges
compiled by Dr. Gerard Grisky and Dr. Gary Zuk,50 information on the
political affiliation of the panel judges was added to the database. The po-
litical affiliation of the panel judges allowed the analysis to test the
47. See generally EARL BABBLE, THE PRACTICE OF SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH (Eve
Howard ed.,Wadsworth Publishing 10th ed. 2004).
48. See id. at 203 (stating "[i]n systematic sampling every kth element in the total list
is chosen (systematically) for inclusion in the sample"). A random number program on a
TI-83 graphing calculator was used to generate the starting number for this process.
49. Id. at 203-04.
50. Gerard Grisky and Gary Zuk, Database on the Attributes of US Appeals Court
Judges, NSF Grant # SBR93-11999 (2000).
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hypothesis that the ambiguity in post-1991 disparate impact law provides
for the influence ofjudges' political ideologies in case outcomes.
B. Results
Since 1977, several notable patterns of plaintiffs' success rates in dis-
parate impact cases are apparent. The data reveal that the Wards Cove
decision dramatically reduced the likelihood that plaintiffs will prevail in
disparate impact litigation. The data also demonstrate that case outcomes
are increasingly correlated with the political ideologies of Circuit judges,
suggesting that the current ambiguous disparate impact legal standards
result in greater ideological discretion. As demonstrated by Table 1, plain-
tiffs successfully challenged employment practices on disparate impact
grounds in 20 of the 97 cases, or 20.6%. The data reveal a striking discrep-
ancy, however, between cases brought before the Wards Cove decision and
cases decided after the decision. Plaintiffs won 32.7% of pre-Wards Cove
cases but won only 6.7% of cases decided after Wards Cove and the 1991
Civil Rights Act. Plaintiffs were five times more likely to prevail under the
pre- Wards Cove framework.
TABLE I
PLAINTIFF SUCCESS RATE
PLAINTIFF
WINS CASES PERCENTAGE
PRE-WARDS COVE 17 52 32.7%
POST-WARDS 3 45 6.7%
COVE
OVERALL 20 97 20.6%
Table 2 reveals the impact of the Wards Cove decision on disparate
impact cases, both at the initial stage of presenting statistical evidence and
after plaintiffs establish a prima facie case of disparate impact. The study
suggests that the Wards Cove requirement that plaintiffs' statistical evidence
must involve comparisons with the qualified relevant labor pool"1 imposes a
nearly insurmountable burden on plaintiffs. Disparate impact plaintiffs were
able to present evidence meeting the EEOC guidelines in only 5 of 45
post-1991 cases (11.1%), compared with 19 of 52 pre-Wards Cove cases
(37%). Plaintiff; who fail to meet this evidentiary burden rarely establish a
51. Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 650.
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prima facie case of disparate impact.2 Therefore, the Wards Cove qualified
labor pool requirement essentially eliminates eight out of nine disparate
impact plaintiffs before employers ever have to justify their challenged
employment practice.
TABLE 2
PLAINTIFF PRESENTS EVIDENCE SATISFYING EEOC GUIDELINES
EVIDENCE SATISFIES
4/5 RULE OR
Two STANDARD
DEVIATIONS TEST CASES PERCENTAGE
Pre-Wards Cove 19 52 36.2%
Post-Wards Cove 5 45 11.1%
Overall 24 97 24.7%
For cases involving plaintiffs who satisfy the Wards Cove evidentiary
burden and establish a prima facie case, the Supreme Court held that em-
ployers only have a burden of production to present a reasonable
justification for business practices 3 instead of a burden of persuasion to
show that the challenged practice has a manifest relationship to the em-
ployment in question.14 The study shows that the Wards Cove rule
significantly improved employers' chances of prevailing after plaintiffs es-
tablished a prima facie case of disparate impact. Table 3 illustrates that
employers were 2.6 times more likely to provide adequate justification for
their challenged employment practices under the Wards Cove burden of
production standard than under the Griggs "manifest relationship" stan-
dard. This result comports with the intention of the Supreme Court's
decision in Wards Cove to ease the burden on employers in disparate im-
pact litigation.
52. Plaintiffs who did not meet the EEOC evidentiary guidelines established a
prima facie case in only 9 of 72 cases.
53. Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 659.
54. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 432.
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TABLE 3
RATES OF ESTABLISHING BUSINESS NECESSITY
FOLLOWING A PRIMA FACIE CASE
[VOL. 11:247
PLAINTIFF PERCENTAGE OF
ESTABLISHED EMPLOYER EST. PRIMA FACIE CASES
PRIMA FACIE BUSINESS SUCCESSFULLY
CASE NECESSITY REBUTTED
Pre-Wards Cove 24 7 29.2%
Post-Wards Cove 8 6 75%
Overall 32 13 40.6%
The chilling effect of Wards Cove on Title VII disparate impact litiga-
tion is apparent across the different circuits included in the study. Table 4
reveals substantial variations in the application of the Griggs standard be-
tween the six different Circuit Courts selected for this study. The success
rates of plaintiffs in the pre- Wards Cove period varied from 0% in the
Ninth Circuit to 86% in the Eleventh Circuit. These disparities were
largely eliminated by the Supreme Court's decision in Wards Cove, how-
ever. From 1992-2000, plaintiffs rarely prevailed in any circuit.
TABLE 4
PLAINTIFF SUCCESS RATES BY CIRCUIT
PRE-WARDS POST-WARDS
COVE COVE OVERALL
2nd Circuit 4/5 = 80% 0/4 = 0% 4/9 = 44%
5th Circuit/1 1th 11/24 = 45.8% 0/6 = 0% 11/30 = 36.7%
Circuit
6th Circuit 1/9 = 11.1% 2/16 = 12.5% 3/25 = 12%
7th Circuit 1/5 = 20% 1/5 = 20% 2/10 = 20%
9th Circuit 0/9 = 0% 0/14 = 0% 0/23 = 0%
In addition to demonstrating the profound chilling effect of Wards
Cove, the study shows the increasing influence of the political ideologies
of the judges deciding Title VII cases. The data supports the intuition that
judges appointed by Democratic presidents may be more sympathetic to
claims of race discrimination than judges appointed by Republican presi-
dents. The results are displayed in Table 5. Overall, Circuit panels
consisting of a majority of Democratic judges were more than twice as
likely to rule in favor of plaintiffs as cases decided by majority Republican
Decline of Title VII Disparate Impact
panels. Furthermore, the impact of political ideology is only apparent in
the post-1991 period.
Since the 1991 Civil Rights Act, 20% of plaintiffs prevailed in cases
heard before majority Democratic panels. By contrast, plaintiffs did not
win any of the post-Act cases argued before majority Republican panels.
The finding of the increased impact of judges' political ideologies follow-
ing Wards Cove and the 1991 Civil Rights Act supports the hypothesis
that the current status of the legal standards governing Title VII litigation
is unclear. Significant scholarly research demonstrates that as the govern-
ing legal rules become more ambiguous, the effect of a judge's political
ideology on case outcomes increases.5 The data suggests that judges are
using the legal ambiguity surrounding post-1991 disparate impact litiga-
tion to reach outcomes consistent with their political ideologies.
TABLE 5
PANEL IDEOLOGY
C. Logistic Regression Analysis
The analysis of disparate impact cases reveals the dramatic chilling
effect of Wards Cove and the increased impact of political ideology of the
deciding panel since the 1991 Civil Rights Act. However, these correla-
tions alone are insufficient to suggest causation. It is possible that the
effects observed here result from an unequal distribution of the quality of
disparate impact cases. For example, post-1991 plaintiffs in cases argued
before majority Democratic panels may, on average, have presented better
55. See Songer et al., supra note 10, at 137-62.
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statistical evidence than cases heard by Republican panels. Multiple re-
gression techniques, which measure the impact of certain variables while
controlling for all other variables, are necessary to make a more definitive
judgment about the relevant effect of different variables on the success of
African American plaintiffs in disparate impact litigation.
The disparate impact database facilitates the use of logistic regression
techniques to determine the relative influence and statistical significance
of numerous variables on the outcomes of Title VII disparate impact liti-
gation. This paper utilizes three different regression equations. To test the
effect of the new legal doctrine established by Wards Cove and the 1991
Civil Rights Act, the study employed a logistic regression model encom-
passing all cases in the database. The regression equation utilized nine
variables relating to disparate impact cases. These variables included:
whether the defendant is a government or private entity, the quality and
type of evidence presented, the type of employment practice being chal-
lenged, whether the plaintiff also presented evidence of specific past acts
of discrimination by the employer, the ideological disposition of the
judges on the appellate panel that heard the case, the sex of the plaintiff,
and the operative legal standard under which the case was judged. Con-
trolling for these relevant case factors, the equation reveals that post-1991
disparate impact legal doctrine dramatically restricts the ability of plaintiffs
to successfully challenge facially-neutral employment practices.
This overall equation included a variable for the political ideology
of the panel deciding the case, which reveals the effect of political ideol-
ogy on all disparate impact decisions over the entire period of the study.
To test whether this influence is more pronounced following the 1991
Civil Rights Act, I compared two additional regression models. The two
models each contained the same case variables as the overall model. One
equation consisted entirely of cases prior to Wards Cove, and the second
model included only post-1991 cases. A comparison of these models sug-
gests that political ideologies of judges profoundly affect post-1991
disparate impact decisions. The methodology and results of these equa-
tions are presented below.
All three equations are based on the same scientific methods. Since
the dependent variable (whether or not plaintiffs successfully challenged
an employment practice) is dichotomous, and ordinary least squares is
inappropriate, I used logistic regression, a maximum likelihood tech-
nique.56 This method produces parameter estimates for the model's
independent variables in terms of each variable's contribution to the
probability that the dependent variable falls into one of the designated
categories (finding for the plaintiff or the employer). For each independ-
ent variable, a maximum likelihood estimate (MLE) is calculated, along
56. See generally JOHN H. ALDRICH & FORREST D. NELSON, LIN.EA PROBABILITY, LOGIT
AND PROBIT MODELS, (Sage Publications 1984).
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with its standard error. 7 The MLE's represent the change in the logistic
function that occurs from a one-unit change in each independent vari-
able. I also present the odds ratios for each variable. 8 The numerical
values of the odds ratios can be used comparatively, as a way to describe
the strength of their effects on the dependent variable.5 9 Each variable's
impact will be assessed usingithese odds ratios.The analysis was performed
in SPSS.
The results of the overall logit analysis, which encompasses all cases
in the database, are presented in Table 6. Generally, results that are signifi-
cant at or beyond .05 or .10 are considered to be statistically significant.6 °
A significance level of .10 indicates that there is less than 10 percent prob-
ability that the observed results are attributable to chance. Results that do
not meet this significance level may be suggestive of the variable's influ-
ence, although there is a greater likelihood that the results occurred
randomly.
TABLE 6
LOGISTIC REGRESSION MODEL: ALL CASES 1977-2000
STANDARD SIGNIFICANCE ODDS
VARIABLE COEFFICIENT ERROR LEVEL RATIO
4/5 Rule or Two 4.36 .96 .00 78.69
Std Deviations
Evid. of Past .59 1.08 .29 1.80
Discrimination
Test .51 .96 .29 1.67
Non-Test 1.33 1.37 .16 3.79
Criteria
Black Female .56 1.04 .29 1.75
Plaintiff
Government -.26 .92 .78 .77
Defendant
Pre-Wards .76 1.01 .22 2.13
Cove
Democrat Panel .67 .86 .21 1.96
Not surprisingly, the variable with the greatest predictive effect on the
outcome of disparate impact cases is whether plaintiffs presented evidence
satisfying the EEOC's four-fifths disparate impact guidelines or the
57. See id.
58. An odds ratio is a ratio of the odds at two different values of the independent
variable. Thus, the odds ratio equals the antilogarithm (e to the power) of the MLE coeffi-
cient.
59. LAWRENCE C. HAMILTON, REGRESSION WITH GRAPHICS: A SECOND COURSE IN
APPLIED STATISTICS, (Brooks/Cole Publishing Co. 1992).
60. Id.
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Supreme Court's Hazelwood "two standard deviation" test. Controlling for
all other variables in the model, courts are 78 times more likely to invali-
date an employment practice when plaintiffs presented evidence satisfying
these tests than when they did not present such evidence. This result is
significant beyond the .001 level, indicating there is less than a one in
1,000 chance that the observed result occurred randomly. This finding
highlights the profound importance of statistics in Title VII litigation;
plaintiffs are virtually assured of defeat if they do not present evidence
satisfying the EEOC guidelines. 6' This result also suggests the powerfully
deleterious impact of the new Wards Cove evidentiary standard on Title
VII plaintiffs. Under Wards Cove, plaintiffs must identify the qualified rele-
vant labor pool with which to draw statistical comparisons. One would
expect that identifying, compiling and analyzing data on the segment of
the population that courts will deem "qualified" for a certain job may be
a daunting challenge for many plaintiffs.
Also, unsurprisingly, the data shows that plaintiffs had more success
challenging specific employment practices than alleging that vague or
subjective practices created an impermissible disparate impact. Plaintiffs
challenging non-test criteria, such as a high school graduation require-
ment, were 3.8 times more likely to prevail than other plaintiffs (p <
.16).62 This finding is not surprising given the skepticism expressed by the
Supreme Court towards the necessity of having a specific degree to per-
form many kinds of work.63
Finally, the results of the logit analysis reveal the effect of the Wards
Cove decision on disparate impact suits. Controlling for all other variables,
courts were 2.13 times more likely to invalidate employment practices
before the Wards Cove decision. There is good reason to suspect that the
demonstrated effect of Wards Cove in the model significantly underesti-
mates its impact. By requiring plaintiffs to identify a qualified relevant
labor pool with which to draw statistical comparisons, Wards Cove is ex-
pected to drastically restrict the ability of plaintiffs to present evidence
satisfying the EEOC's "four-fifths" disparate impact guideline. However,
this effect is not attributed to the Wards Cove decision in the regression
model because the model controls separately for whether plaintiffs pre-
sented acceptable statistical evidence. The odds multiplier of 2.13
calculated by the regression analysis only represents the significance of the
new doctrine in the final stage of disparate impact litigation.
61. Plaintiffs who did not present evidence satisfying either the four-fifths or two
standard deviations criteria lost 70 of 72 cases (97.2%).
62. Although this finding is significant beyond a .05 level, it is highly suggestive of
the variable's effect.
63. See Griggs, 401 U.S. at 436 (holding that employer "must measure the person for
the job and not the person in the abstract") and at 431 (observing that employees who did
not meet the high school diploma requirement had satisfactory performance records).
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After a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the court's inquiry fo-
cuses on whether the employer can justify the challenged policy, and
whether plaintiffs can demonstrate that this justification is pre-textual. At
this stage of litigation, Wards Cove eases the burden on employers and
heightens the burden on litigants. The calculated odds multiplier only il-
lustrates the impact Wards Cove exerts at this final stage of disparate
impact litigation. The 1991 Civil Rights Act was intended to reverse this
aspect of the Wards Cove decision. The demonstrated impact of the Wards
Cove variable suggests that the Act did not accomplish its aim. Some fed-
eral judges continue to apply the restrictive doctrine announced in Wards
Cove instead of the more permissive standard prescribed by the Civil
Rights Act.
To test the extent to which the failure of the 1991 Civil Rights Act
to reverse the Wards Cove decision is attributable to the increasingly con-
servative federal judiciary, I compared two additional regression models.
The models contain identical variables to the overall regression model,
but are separated by time period. The first model contains all cases in the
dataset decided before Wards Cove, and the second model contains all
cases decided subsequent to the 1991 Civil Rights Act. The results of
these two logit equations are presented in Tables 7 and 8.
TABLE 7
LOGISTIC REGRESSION: 1977-1988 CASES (PR- WARDS COVE)
STANDARD SIGNIFICANCE ODDS
VARIABLE COEFFICIENT ERROR LEVEL RATIO
4/5 Rule or 2 3.71 1.06 .00 40.75
Std Deviations
Evid. of Past .47 1.60 .35 1.60
Discrimination
Test .29 .99 .38 1.34
Non-Test 1.62 1.51 .14 5.03
Criteria
Plaintiff .93 1.08 .19 2.54
B/Female
Govt Defendant -.19 1.01 .85 .83
Democrat Panel -.12 .93 .45 .89
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TABLE 8
LOGISTIC REGRESSION: 1992-2000 CASES
(POST-1991 CIVIL RIGHTS ACT)
STANDARD SIGNIFICANCE ODDS
VARIABLE COEFFICIENT ERROR LEVEL RATIO
4/5 Rule or 2 4.61 1.07 .00 100.83
Std Deviations
Evid. of Past .54 2.57 .42 1.72
Discrimination
Test 1.25 3.10 .34 3.50
Non-Test .22 4.06 .48 1.25
Criteria
Plaintiff -.04 2.36 .49 .96
B/Female
Govt Defendant .28 2.09 .89 1.33
Democrat Panel 1.34 2.30 .28 3.81
A comparison of the two regression equations illustrates that the po-
litical ideologies of judges deciding disparate impact cases have a much
greater impact following adoption of the 1991 Civil Rights Act. Control-
ling for all other variables in the model, the party affiliation of the
majority of judges on the appellate panel had no discernable impact on
case outcomes from 1977-1988. However, in the post-1991 period, plain-
tiffs were nearly 4 times more likely to prevail in cases decided by
majority Democratic panels. In the post-1991 period, the political ideol-
ogy of the appellate panel was the variable with the second-greatest
predictive force in determining the outcome of disparate impact cases.
Although this variable is not statistically significant due to the small sam-
ple of appellate disparate impact decisions since 1991, the data suggest that
judges' ideologies powerfully impact post-1991 case outcomes. By con-
trast, the data reveal absolutely zero impact of judges ideologies in the
pre- Wards Cove time period.
The influence of ideology in the post-Act period is likely attribut-
able to the vague language of the Civil Rights Act" and its direction for
judges to decide cases in accordance with past precedents. Because of the
conflicting nature of these precedents, judges are likely to rely on cases
that reach outcomes consistent with their personal preferences. Scholars
have previously posited that the Act's vague language may facilitate incon-
sistent application of the doctrine because judges pick and choose among
past decisions. 6 The results of this analysis bolster this hypothesis and con-
64. See Browne, supra note 9, at 350 (stating that "the Act 'codified' case law that was
far from harmonious.").
65. Id.
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firm that judges' political affiliations significantly affect the success of dis-
parate impact challenges.
Furthermore, judicial decision-making does not appear arbitrary-it
is systematically linked to partisan affiliation. Controlling for myriad fac-
tors relating to the objective strength of plaintiffs' cases, Democratic
judges were far more likely to decide disparate impact cases in favor of
plaintiffs than Republican judges following Wards Cove.66 These results
suggest that the decreasing success of African American disparate impact
plaintiffs may be significantly attributable to the increasingly conservative
federal judiciary. The overall success rate for African American plaintiffs in
disparate impact cases fell precipitously from 33% in pre-Wards Cove liti-
gation to less than 7% in post-1991 cases. However, the success rate of
plaintiffs with the good fortune to argue their cases in front of majority-
Democratic panels only fell from 33% to 20%.The overall drop in plaintiff
success exists in part because majority-Republican panels decided a far
higher percentage of cases in the post-1991 period (67%) than in the pre-
Wards Cove period (37%).7 The study shows that a major cause of the di-
minished success in African American disparate impact challenges is not
only the new legal standards per se, but the ambiguity that allows an in-
creasingly conservative federal judiciary to restrict disparate impact
doctrine.
This finding portends an ominous future for Title VII disparate im-
pact litigation. The increasingly conservative federal judiciary should be
expected to further restrict the application of disparate impact doctrine.
Due to the conservative appellate appointments by President George W
Bush, the federal judiciary is presumably more conservative today than in
2000, the last year included in this study. One would expect an even
higher percentage of future cases to be decided by conservative panels
disposed to rule against disparate impact plaintiffs.
III. ARGUMENT FOR UNAMBIGUOUS DISPARATE IMPACT STANDARDS
The results of this study demonstrate that African Americans chal-
lenging employment practices under Title VII have little chance of success.
Black plaintiffs were successful in only 6% of disparate impact cases de-
cided by the Courts of Appeals in the post-1991 period. The current
unavailability of disparate impact doctrine is disturbing for three principal
reasons.
First, without a meaningful opportunity to show disparate impact,
plaintiffs facing discrimination must establish an employer's discriminatory
intent. A showing of discriminatory intent is onerous and will result in
66. See Table 8: since the passage of the 1991 Civil Rights Act, Democratic judges
found in favor of plaintiffs 3.81 times as often as Republican judges.
67. SeeTable 5.
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redress for plaintiffs in only an extremely limited number of "smoking
gun" cases. Second, the demise of disparate impact doctrine eviscerates
any remedy against practices that disadvantage African Americans based
on social inequalities, or against employers who unconsciously discrimi-
nate. Finally, this study reveals that the post-1991 disparate impact
doctrine is sufficiently ambiguous to allow judges' political ideologies to
imbue their decisions. Given the increasingly conservative federal judici-
ary, the availability of disparate impact challenges to facially-neutral
employment practices may be restricted even further. Congress should
clarify disparate impact standards to ensure that Title VII remains a viable
tool for eliminating intentional and unconscious discrimination.
A. Proving Discriminatory Intent is Not a Viable
Alternative to Disparate Impact
Numerous commentators assert that an intent requirement would
severely limit the reach of Title VII. 68 Mandating a finding of discrimina-
tory intent restricts successful challenges of employment practices to rare
cases of unsophisticated employers who flaunt their inclinations to dis-
criminate. The Griggs court recognized that disparate impact doctrine is
essential to providing a meaningful avenue for challenging discriminatory
employment practices. The Court emphasized that "good intent or ab-
sence of discriminatory intent does not redeem employment procedures
or testing mechanisms that operate as 'built-in headwinds' for minority
groups ... Congress directed the thrust of the Act to the consequences of
employment practices, not simply the motivation."69
The Supreme Court's 1976 decision in Washington v. Davis illustrates
the chilling effect the intent requirement has on disparate impact litiga-
tion. The Davis court held that disparate impact plaintiffs challenging
employment practices under the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th
Amendment do not provoke strict scrutiny of the challenged employment
practice without showing an employer's intent to discriminate.7 0 The
plaintiffs, a class of African American applicants to the Washington, DC
police department, challenged the department's use of a written test in
making employment decisions7 African Americans failed the test at a rate
4 times higher than Whites. 72 Despite this adverse impact on Black appli-
cants, the Court refused to invoke strict scrutiny due to the test's facially-
68. See Turner, supra note 40, at 384. See also Eisenberg & Johnson, supra note 13, at
1152.
69. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 432.
70. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
71. id.
72. Id. at 237.
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neutral character." The Court emphatically stated that disparate impact "is
not the sole touchstone of an invidious racial discrimination forbidden by
the Constitution " '74 In the 28 years since the Washington v. Davis decision,
no plaintiff has ever satisfied the Court's intent requirement in a constitu-
tional disparate impact action.
The restrictive Title VII disparate impact doctrine applied by courts
since the Wards Cove decision and the 1991 Civil Rights Act precludes
almost all challenges to facially-neutral employment practices." Absent
Congressional intervention, plaintiffs will be forced to rely on proving the
discriminatory intent of employers. Past cases and scholarly analysis sug-
gest that proving discriminatory intent is not a viable alternative for
African Americans facing employment discrimination.
7 6
B. Disparate Impact Doctrine is Necessary to Mitigate Social Inequality
Even if plaintiffs could prove discriminatory intent in cases of inten-
tional discrimination, a robust disparate impact doctrine is necessary to
address the adverse impact engendered by unconscious racial bias and the
effects of the historical subjugation of African Americans. Eradication of
barriers to employment opportunities and the integration of African
Americans into the workforce were central tenants of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act.7 Senator Hubert Humphrey, one of the chief sponsors of the
Act, asserted during floor debate on the bill that "[t]he crux of the prob-
lem is to open employment opportunities for Negroes in occupations
which have been traditionally closed to them.''
78
African Americans continue to face barriers to the employment op-
portunities described by Senator Humphrey. Tremendous inequality
persists in educational opportunities and professional attainment. The
most recent study by the Civil Rights Project at Harvard University
found that 70% of minority children attend American schools with ma-
jority-minority populations.79 More than one-third of these children
attend schools that are comprised of at least 90% African American stu-
dents.8 ° African American students continue to score significantly lower
than White students on standardized tests used in college and graduate
73. Id. at 247-48.
74. Id. at 242.
75. See Table 5 (only three out of forty-five African American disparate impact
plaintiffi have prevailed since 1991 (7%); over 93% have lost).
76. See, e.g., Browne, supra note 9.
77. 110 CONG. REc. 6548 (1964)
78. 110 CONG. REc. 6548 (1964) (remarks of Senator Humphrey).
79. Peter Applebome, What Did We Just Learn, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 22, 2002, § 4, at 3.
80. Id.
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school admissions.8 ' Furthermore, these trends have been increasing in the
past decade: the gap in SAT scores between White and Black students rose
from 187 points in 1993 to 206 points by 2003.2 School segregation is
also on the rise.83
Given these disparities, it is not surprising that Black Americans
have not attained professional parity with Whites. According to the 2000
census, the median income for African American households was $15,000
less than the median income for White households. 84 The Family of Four
Project at the Heritage Foundation calculated that the average White
family of four has a net worth of over $140,000 while the net worth of an
81
average four-person African American family is only $22,230. Poor so-
cioeconomic status, in conjunction with statistics presented above
illustrating educational disparity for African Americans, suggest that Black
applicants remain susceptible to being adversely impacted by facially-
neutral barriers to employment opportunity. Intelligence and aptitude
tests, as well as requirements of certain educational degrees or prior job
experience, are likely to disproportionately exclude Black applicants. Such
exclusion erodes Title VII's purpose of opening employment opportuni-
ties to African Americans. Congress should charge employers with
providing sufficient justifications for policies that perpetuate this exclu-
sion. Alabama Law professor and civil rights scholar Ronald Turner notes
that Title VII, "as currently interpreted and enforced, is no match for the
societal, economic, and political conditions, both past and present, which
have limited the educational, economic, and employment opportunities
and advancements of large segments of African American communities.
86
C. The Vague Language of the 1991 Civil Rights Act Results
in Ideologically-Driven judicial Decisions
Without Congressional action to clarify the current state of dispa-
rate impact doctrine, the ability of plaintiffs to challenge facially-neutral
employment practices is likely to deteriorate further. Research on appeals
court decision-making indicates that the political ideology ofjudges has a
greater effect on court decisions when the governing legal rules are am-
81. Richard Rothstein, SAT Scores Aren't Up. Not Bad, Not Bad at All, N.Y TIMES,
Aug. 29, 2001, at B8.
82. Michael Berube, Testing Handicaps, N.YTIMEs, Sept. 21, 2003, § 6 (Magazine), at
18.
83. Id.
84. Katharine Q. Seelye, Poverty Rates Fell in 2000, But Income Was Stagnant, N.Y
TIMES, Sept. 26, 2001, at A12.
85. See The Heritage Foundation Research, The Family of Four Project, available at
http://www.heritage.org/Research/Features/Faniflyof4/chapter3/chapter3.htm (last vis-
ited September 21, 2005).
86. See Turner, supra note 40, at 386.
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biguous. 87 As discussed in Section II of this paper, the 1991 Civil Rights
Act created ambiguity in disparate impact doctrine by including vague
exceptions and directing judges to consider conflicting precedent. Given
this ambiguity, one would expect the political ideology of judges to drive
disparate impact decisions to a greater extent following the 1991 Act than
before the Act.
Consistent with this theory, the results of this study indicate that the
political ideologies of judges affect disparate impact case outcomes to a
greater extent in the post-1991 period in which courts must interpret the
vague guidelines contained in the 1991 Civil Rights Act. Plaintiffs did not
win a single post-Act disparate impact case decided by a panel composed
of a majority of Republican-appointed judges. By contrast, plaintiffs suc-
cessfully challenged facially neutral employment practices in 20% of post-
Act cases decided by Democratic panels. The gross disparity in post-Act
outcomes based on the political affiliation of the panel judges contrasts
sharply with the negligible differences between Republican and Democ-
ratic panel decisions prior to Wards Cove.
The clear implication of the increased importance ofjudges' ideolo-
gies is that the future success of plaintifth is likely to be curtailed by the
increasingly conservative federal judiciary. An important reason for the
observed decline in successful disparate impact challenges is the simple
fact that a higher percentage of cases are being decided by conservative
judges, who are ideologically predisposed to favor employers in employ-
ment law disputes. In the six circuits examined in this study, panels with a
majority of Democratic appointees decided 63% of cases between 1977 and
1988. By contrast, majority-Democratic panels decided only 33% of the
cases from 1992-2000. 8 One scholar asserts that "[a] majority of federal
judges, led by the Reagan-Bush-appointed majority on the Supreme
Court, have come to believe that Title VII cannot be a significant agent in
removing the vestiges of our long history of racial discrimination."89 Al-
though this study only includes data through the end of 2000, one would
expect this trend to have intensified with the numerous conservative appel-
late appointments by President George W Bush.90 The current vagueness in
Title VII disparate impact doctrine, combined with the conservative nature
87. See Songer et al., supra note 10, at 137-62.
88. See Table 5 (percentage of cases decided by majority-Democratic panels derived
by taking number of cases decided by majority-Democratic panels and dividing it by total
number of cases from that specific time period.).
89. Jerome M. Culp, Jr., Neutrality, the Race Question, and the 1991 Civil Rights Act:
The "Impossibility" of Permanent Reform, 45 RUTGERS L. REV. 965,967 (1993).
90. President Bush appointed 225 federal judges in his first term, 198 of whom
were confirmed by the Senate. See Senate Democratic Policy Committee, Bush Judicial
Nominees Confirmed at a Rate Better Than or Equal to Recent Presidents,Jul. 22, 2004, available
at http://democrats.senate.gov/dpc/dpc-doc.cfm?docname=f-108-2-197 (last visited
October 25, 2005).
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of judges deciding most disparate impact cases, creates an environment
increasingly hostile to disparate impact litigation. Congress must clarify
the 1991 Civil Rights Act to reverse the current trend of conservative
judges eviscerating the disparate impact doctrine.
D. Policy Prescriptions
The aggregate effect of the difficulty of proving discriminatory in-
tent, the lingering social inequality based on race, and the growing
influence of conservative federal judges is that African American job ap-
plicants have virtually no redress against facially-neutral policies that
adversely affect them. According to Table 1, fewer than 7% of Title VII
disparate impact plaintiffs since 1992 prevailed in court, and the possibility
of proving discriminatory intent is probably even more remote. Absent
Congressional intervention to clarify disparate impact law, this bleak pic-
ture is likely to be even further eroded by the increasingly conservative
federal judiciary. Given the persistent disparities in educational and profes-
sional attainment between White and Black Americans, Congress should
not remain idle while the goals of Title VII are extinguished.
Three changes to the 1991 Civil Rights Act would dramatically in-
crease Title VII's efficacy for combating discrimination. First, Congress
should reverse the Wards Cove requirement that plaintiffs must identify a
qualified labor force with which to draw statistical comparisons. This re-
quirement is a powerful cause of the erosion of disparate impact doctrine.
Table 2 shows that plaintiffs were 3.3 times more likely to present suffi-
cient statistical evidence prior to the "qualified" restriction, and plaintiffs
presenting such evidence were nearly 80 times more likely to prevail as
plaintiffs who did not meet this evidentiary burden. The Fourth Circuit's
decision in Carter v. Ball91 illustrates the obstacles faced by plaintiffs at-
tempting to meet the "qualified labor pool" requirement. The African
American plaintiff in Carter demonstrated that none of the defendant
company's 30 managerial level positions were filled by African American
employees. 92 Nonetheless, the Fourth Circuit refused to consider the
plaintiff's evidence because she could not prove the number of African
Americans in the local population who were qualified to hold managerial
positions.93 The court refused the plaintiff's request to infer that, at a
minimum, more than 0% of the local Black population must have been
"qualified."
94
Second, Congress should explicitly charge the employer with the
burden of refuting a plaintiff's prima facie case by establishing that the
91. 33 F3d 450 (4th Cir. 1994).
92. Id. at 457.
93. Id.
94. Id.
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challenged practice is a business necessity. If the employment practice at
issue is truly a business necessity, history suggests that employers should be
able to demonstrate this necessity to the courts. Requiring employers to
demonstrate business necessity will not preclude employers from using
legitimately important criteria to make hiring decisions. Before the Wards
Cove decision lessened the burden on employers to justify their disparity-
inducing practices, employers still prevailed in 68% of all cases, including
30% of cases in which plaintiffs established a prima facie case of a prac-
tice's disparate impact. However, employment practices that adversely
impact African Americans and are not business necessities must be elimi-
nated to achieve Title VII's goal of opening employment opportunities.
Third, Congress should clearly enumerate these policies rather than
subjecting them to interpretation of confused precedents or vague excep-
tions by the judiciary. Such clarity is essential to avoid ideologically-
driven judicial erosion of the Congressional action. This study indicates
that contemporary judges continue to impose the restrictive Wards Cove
framework, contrary to the 1991 Civil Rights Act, in post-Act disparate
impact cases. For example, numerous post-1991 decisions hold that an
employer's burden following a prima facie case is only to articulate some
"legitimate business justification" for the challenged practice, despite the
Act's attempt to nullify this portion of the Wards Cove framework. 9 Un-
ambiguous legal standards are essential to reduce ideological discretion.
CONCLUSION
Justice Blackmun's dissent from the landmark Wards Cove decision
reflects the widely held perception that the decision would dramatically
restrict the ability of plaintiffs to challenge facially-neutral employment
practices under Title VII: "One wonders whether the majority still be-
lieves that race discrimination-or, more accurately, race discrimination
against nonwhites-is a problem in our society, or even remembers that it
ever was. 96 Congress responded to Wards Cove by passing the 1991 Civil
Rights Act which was designed to mitigate the chilling effect of Wards
Cove on disparate impact litigation. This paper employed logistic regres-
sion techniques to test the efficacy of the 1991 Act in moderating the
deleterious effect of Wards Cove on disparate impact challenges, and to test
the hypothesis that the vague language of the 1991 Act allows broad dis-
cretion for judges based on their political ideologies.
The central finding of the analysis is clear: the current disparate im-
pact doctrine engendered by Wards Cove and the 1991 Civil Rights Act
dramatically reduces the ability of African American plaintiffs to successfully
95. See, e.g., Fitzpatrick v. City of Atlanta, 2 F3d 1112 (11th Cir. 1993); Rosser v.
Pipe Fitters Local 392, No. 92-3016, 1993 US App. LEXIS 31484 (6th Cir. 1993).
96. Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 662 (Blackmun,J., dissenting).
FALL 2005]
Michigan Journal of Race & Law
challenge facially neutral employment practices in federal court. The ero-
sion of disparate impact doctrine is significantly attributable to
conservative judges exploiting the ambiguous legal standards to decide
cases in accordance with their ideological proclivities. That the ideologies
of federal judges affect the outcome of disparate impact litigation is espe-
cially salient in the heated political climate engulfing judicial nominations.
Although it is certainly possible that judges' ideologies impact decisions in
numerous cases involving major political issues, more research is necessary
to explore the impact of ideology in other areas. This analysis does not
purport to make any generalizations beyond the context of disparate im-
pact litigation. In the disparate impact arena, however, the analysis
demonstrates that the ideologies of conservative judges increasingly con-
tribute to the unavailability of challenges to employment practices that
disproportionately exclude African Americans.
The data presented support these conclusions. Since the 1991 Civil
Rights Act ushered in vague disparate impact standards, plaintiffs prevailed
in 20% of disparate impact cases decided by majority-Democratic panels,
but did not prevail in any case decided by majority-Republican panels.
The logistic regression model, controlling for myriad factors relating to
plaintiff success, calculates that plaintiffs were 3.8 times more likely to
prevail in cases decided by Democratic panels during this period.
The lack of a meaningful disparate impact doctrine through which
African Americans can challenge facially-neutral employment practices
has several disturbing implications. Plaintiffs are virtually precluded from
challenging employment practices that are "fair in form, but discrimina-
tory in operation ' '97 due to the extreme difficulty of proving that the
practices were enacted with discriminatory intent. Only rare "smoking
gun" cases are actionable without the availability of disparate impact liti-
gation. Even if plaintiffs could divine the intent of employers, a robust
disparate impact doctrine is necessary to eradicate disparate outcomes
resulting from unconscious discrimination or social inequality wrought by
the historical subjugation of African Americans in the United States. Due
to the ambiguity in current disparate impact law and the increasingly
conservative federal judiciary, one should expect even further erosion of
plaintiffs' abilities to challenge facially-neutral employment practices in
the future.
Courts have stripped Title VII of its power to open employment op-
portunities to African Americans at a time of increasing inequality in
education and employment. Recent data reveals that school enrollment is
becoming more segregated, and the gap between Whites and Blacks in
educational test scores and household income is increasing. Today, White
households in America make an average of $15,000 per year more than
97. See Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431.
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African American households. The data suggest that African Americans
remain vulnerable to facially-neutral requirements which foreclose certain
employment opportunities to underprivileged groups. Now is not the
time for Congress to abandon Title VII's goal of opening employment
* opportunities for African Americans. Without new Congressional action
that unambiguously reverses crucial elements of the Wards Cove decision,
Title VII will not be an effective vehicle for removing barriers to eco-
nomic opportunity and professional achievement for African Americans.
98. See Seelye, supra note 84.
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